MFL Comments on Steven Ewing Inquest Report

The MFL has reviewed in great detail Judge Cummings' report and recommendations made following the inquest into the fatal explosion at the Flin Flon smelter in 2000. While it is disappointed with the limited findings and narrow focus of the report, the MFL fully understands the confines of the Fatality Inquires Act on a Provincial Court judge who conducts an inquest.

It became very clear reading the report that recommendations must be based solely on the evidence presented. Some of the points made would be valuable for comparable industries in preventing injuries and possible deaths, yet no recommendation to apply those principles could have been made without detailed evidence in support. This was disappointing as lessons learned from Steve Ewing's death should be used to prevent other injuries and deaths in similar circumstances.

There are positive decisions made that answer some of the concerns the MFL had when it requested standing at the hearings. One of the MFL's main issues relate to the amendments of the Workplace Safety and Health Act that were made in 2002. Does the current Act and body of regulations have the capability of preventing deaths similar to Steve Ewing's from occurring in the future? The Judge noted it was his opinion that the Act has that capability but adjustments are needed for some regulations.

The report includes the evidence from the testimony presented by witnesses who were involved in the events leading up to the explosion on August 7 and 8, 2000. It examines the components of the shutdowns' planning, supervision, worker activity, expert reports, furnace and furnace materials to determine what had occurred and what circumstances could be addressed.

The testimony showed that it was not the washing of dust that caused the death of Steve Ewing, it was the collection of the water on top of the very hot material in the furnace. When the crust of the material cracked, the water was able to contact the molten materials underneath and this mixture exploded, severely burning Steve Ewing and his co-workers. Ewing eventually died as a result of those burns.

In simpler terms, if water had not been used to wash down the dust, no bomb would have been built, no explosion would have occurred and Steve Ewing would be alive today. This conclusion was also reached by the joint committee during their investigation immediately following the explosion. The primary recommendation of the unions to never allow water to come in contact with molten metal was agreed to and supported by the judge.

The judge also noted that no one was able to recognize the hazard of water on molten metal. The planners used job procedures to deal with risks associated with the washdown. Creating a different procedure would have done little to prevent such an explosion and the report recognizes this. The Judge provided extensive analysis of the benefits of a more systematic approach to creating safer workplaces by the use of engineering controls first and foremost.

The judge supported the recommendation of the union to include the precise order of controlling hazards in law. This agrees with the MFL's recommendation that a hazard based approach to prevention be used instead of risk management in dealing effectively with safety in the workplace.

Another disappointment came when the Judge failed to provide comment and support for the MFL's recommendation for mandatory inquests. When asked to review the Fatality Inquiries Act by other submissions, he did note the following;
"This inquest has value however as a final look at the events which occurred in the company's workplace, as a final chance for all those who were involved to come forward and speak about it and as an opportunity to look at the changes which have been made in the workplace and to laws and regulations."

The MFL agrees with that sentiment and for that reason, the MFL feels that an inquest into every workplace fatality is another means to ensure that workers will be better protected. Though the MFL felt that the inquest report should have gone further, we admit that there are limitations to be overcome and the recommendations that did come out of Steve Ewing’s death will make workplaces safer where employers cooperate in the internal responsibility system.

In order to reduce the annual number of injuries and deaths, the labour movement needs to reassess the way in which it attempts prevention. We will still participate in the joint committee structures, we will still educate our members on better, healthier and safer ways to do their work. We will continue to call for more effective enforcement in those workplaces where employers are less cooperative and do not take the safety of their workers seriously.

Finally, unions must begin discussions on how to improve the systems meant to protect workers that fail at least 30 workers each year who die and another 40,000 who report injuries.